Eurocity London: a qualitative comparison of graduate migration from Germany, Italy and Latvia by Russell King (3842911) et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Eurocity London: a qualitative comparison
of graduate migration from Germany, Italy
and Latvia
Russell King1,2*, Aija Lulle1,3, Francesca Conti4 and Dorothea Mueller1
* Correspondence:
R.King@sussex.ac.uk
1University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
2Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
This paper compares the motivations and characteristics of the recent migration to
London of young-adult graduates from Germany, Italy and Latvia. Conceptually the
paper links three domains: the theory of core–periphery structures within Europe; the
notion of London as both a global city and a ‘Eurocity’; and the trope of ‘crisis’. The
dataset analysed consists of 95 in-depth biographical interviews and the paper’s main
objective is to tease out the narrative similarities and differences between the three
groups interviewed. Each of the three nationalities represents a different geo-economic
positioning within Europe. German graduates move from one economically prosperous
country to another; they traverse shallow economic and cultural boundaries. Italian
graduates migrate from a relatively peripheral Southern European country where,
especially in Southern Italy, employment and career prospects have long been
difficult, and have become more so in the wake of the financial crisis. They find
employment opportunities in London which are unavailable to them in Italy.
Latvian graduates are from a different European periphery, the Eastern one, post-
socialist and post-Soviet. Like the Italians, their moves are economically driven whereas,
for the Germans, migration is more related to lifestyle and life-stage. For all three groups,
the chance to live in a large, multicultural, cosmopolitan city is a great attraction. And for
all groups, thoughts about the future are marked by uncertainty and ambiguity.
Keywords: London, Eurocity, Graduate migrants, Core–periphery, Economic crisis
Introduction
In his brilliant book Eurostars and Eurocities, Adrian Favell portrays London as the
Eurocity par excellence (Favell, 2008, pp. 30–45). This is despite widespread British
Euroscepticism, reinforced by the May 2015 election during which uncontrolled immi-
gration from Europe was a hot topic, and an impending referendum on Britain’s con-
tinued membership of the EU. London’s Eurocity credentials are summed up by Favell
as follows: ‘no other city has been able to compete with London’s cultural cool and
economic clout, or its access to the English-language business, media and cultural
worlds’. As a result,
A quiet and unstoppable European invasion… has taken place in the latter half of
the 1990s… London became increasingly the target of mobile young continental
Europeans, in fact, the prime destination of European free movement for this
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particular generation. It started with West Europeans – from France, Spain,
Denmark, Germany, Italy – and in the new millennium extended, with enlargement
around the corner, to a new wave of East Europeans (Favell, 2008, p. 30, emphasis in
original).
Favell’s book stopped short of a thorough-going analysis of the effects of the 2004
and 2007 enlargements, and it was published just before the financial crisis struck in
late 2008. Hence in this paper we mainly focus on the more recent migratory dynamics
into the UK’s capital region, shaped by EU enlargement and economic crisis. We specu-
late whether the Eurostar metaphor is as appropriate to these more recent arrivals as it
was for those of the 1990s and early 2000s.
Based on 95 interviews with German, Italian and Latvian graduate migrants collected
in and around London during 2009–13, we explore and compare how the interviewees
articulate their motivations for, and experiences of, migration. The three nationality
groups were strategically chosen: one from a prosperous country of the European ‘core’
economic area, one from the Southern periphery, and the third from the Eastern per-
iphery. In terms of typologies of comparison (Martiniello, 2013), this study is an ex-
ample of ‘convergent’ comparison, whereby the essence of the comparison is that
between comparable people (recent graduates from three different countries) undergo-
ing a similar experience (immigrating, living and working) in the same geographic loca-
tion (London).
The idea of Europe as a core–periphery structure is central to our analytical frame-
work. Two other conceptual domains underpin our analysis, both introduced in the
above brief discussion of Favell’s study. These are the notion of London as both a
‘Eurocity’ and a global city which attracts young graduates from many parts of Europe
and the world, and the trope of ‘crisis’ which is much used when discussing European
economic trends of the post-2008 years, especially in the peripheral states of the euro-
zone. These three conceptual frames are outlined in more detail in the next section of
the paper.
Before we come to that, we set out the key questions of our comparative study.
We ask, firstly, how recent graduates from the three selected countries narratively
interpret and explain their motivations for moving to London and their experi-
ences of working and living there. What are the similarities and differences in the
narrative themes developed by the three samples of interviewees? To what extent
do they justify their decisions and behaviours with reference to our three key
framing notions of peripherality, crisis and global-city London? And for each of
the groups, to what extent are economic motives – income, employment, career
development – important, as opposed to the ‘lifestyle’ attractions of living in such
an economically and culturally vibrant metropolis? Finally, how do the research
participants envisage their future migratory trajectories?
Conceptual frames: core–periphery, global-city London, and the crisis
The above introduction made reference to the ‘periphery’ of Europe as being more se-
verely affected by the economic crisis, and thus by the ‘new’ emigration of highly edu-
cated young adults. This leads us to rejuvenate the core–periphery model of spatially
uneven development as a theoretical device to help explain how these flows come about.
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This model, also referred to as ‘centre–periphery’, derives from the Latin American
dependencia school of the 1960s (see Frank, 1969), which arose as a counter-thesis to the
‘stages-of-growth’ modernisation theory which dominated thinking about the development
process in the early postwar period (Rostow, 1960). These opposed theoretical stances also
frame very different interpretations of migration’s relationship with development. On the
one hand, labour migration from less- to more-developed countries helps to correct the im-
balance between the two and enables the former to transition to a higher stage of modern-
isation via remittances and the factor-price equalisation of wages through rebalancing the
supply and demand for labour. On the other, the extraction of migrant labour and human
capital from the periphery serves only to benefit the destination countries of the
core and to maintain the peripheral countries in a state of poverty and dependent
development (De Haas, 2010).
Early dependency-school literature made little reference to core–periphery struc-
tures within Europe; this was rectified by Seers, Schaffer, and Kiljunen (1979),
whose book Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core–Periphery Relations analysed
the various lines of dependency connecting what they called the ‘secondary
European economies’ with the industrial economies of the ‘core’. Such lines of
unequal dependency included trade, foreign investment, tourism and, of course,
migration. Case-studies were made of Spain, Portugal, Southern Italy, Greece,
Ireland and Finland – a roll-call of the main European countries of emigration
during the early postwar decades, until the oil crisis of 1973–74. Geographers’
flow-maps demonstrated the almost-perfect symmetry of the periphery-to-core
migratory links which bound the continent together at this time, with the excep-
tion of Eastern Europe, blocked off by the migration barrier of the Iron Curtain
(King, 1993; Salt & Clout, 1976).
Recent migration flows, since the 1990s and especially since the latter half of the
2000s, represent a reactivation of these same periphery-to-core patterns 40–50 years
later (King, 2015). But there are also new trends. First, the removal of the Iron Curtain
has opened up the whole of Eastern Europe as a labour periphery with strong migration
flows to the core, facilitated by EU accession in some cases. Second, we observe the rise
of the UK, and especially the London region, to a position of much greater dominance
for current intra-European flows than it had in the past. This is especially true for
graduate-level jobs (Favell, 2008, pp. 30–45; Favell & Recchi, 2009; Recchi, 2015, pp.
49–77) and reflects London’s emergence as Europe’s one truly global city (Sassen,
2001). A third refinement to the core–periphery model is to nuance its binary character
by introducing gradations of centrality and peripherality. Some countries could be
regarded as semi-peripheral based on their economic status and migration trends (for
instance those with both immigration and emigration – like Italy). The sub-national re-
gional patterning of migration flows and their increasing typological diversity (espe-
cially as regards new regimes of mobility) mean that a state-level classification of core
and periphery is too crude (Williams, 2009). Italy is again the best exemplar: the North
close to the Euro-core and the South more peripheral, with graduate outflows both to
the ‘core’ of Italy in Milan and the the rest of the Italian North, and to London and
other major Eurocities (Conti, 2012).
The second conceptual frame relates to London not just as a Eurocity (Favell, 2008)
but also as a global city (Sassen, 2001). As a global city and former imperial capital, its
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migration dynamics have a long history and have evolved over constantly shifting geo-
graphical fields. Following Friedmann’s (1986) ‘world city hypothesis’, London can be
seen as a dominant component of a contemporary metageography of global-
metropolitan nodes which generate their own spaces and flows of capital, goods, ideas,
services – and migrants (Beaverstock, Smith, & Taylor, 2000). Sassen’s analysis of the
archetypal global city focused, amongst other things, on the dynamic polarisation of
wealth, class, the labour market and social geography (Sassen, 2001, pp. 308–314, 321–
323), with immigrants playing a crucial role in driving this polarisation, contributing
both to the highly remunerated elites and, more massively, to the low-wage subprole-
tariat. If this model of hour-glass social recomposition was laboratory-tested by studies
of New York and Los Angeles, May, Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert, and McIlwane (2007)
and Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert, May, and McIlwane (2010) show how the polarisation
model also applies to London’s ‘new migrant divisions of labour’.
Fifty years ago, London’s low-wage migrants came mainly from the Caribbean and
the Indian subcontinent. Nowadays, it is migrants from Africa, Latin America and
Eastern Europe who keep the mechanics of the city’s economy ticking over – cleaning
and caring for, and in many other ways servicing the needs of, the rest of the popula-
tion, including tourists and visitors. Rather less studied are the young European gradu-
ates who have arrived on a large scale since the 1990s, and especially during the 2000s:
some, yes, to become Eurostars à la Favell but the majority to get more modest em-
ployment as what Conradson and Latham (2005a) and others (e.g. Parutis, 2014) have
labelled ‘middling transnationals’. The literature on this new migration of graduates
from the EU’s crisis-affected peripheral countries is limited but fast-developing, either
based on small-N interview samples or larger-N online surveys (see Bygnes, 2015;
Labrianidis & Vogiatzis, 2013; Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014).
Crisis – our third framing device – is a word which is all-too-easily mobilised to de-
scribe important events. In terms of the unfolding migration and refugee situation in
the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, the term is widely applied, even if, as in
the past (e.g. Weiner, 1995), the ‘blame’ for the crisis is too readily and wrongly heaped
on the shoulders of the migrants. In this paper we use the word in its economic sense
(Bevelander & Petersson, 2014), and also as a discursive device which echoes through
some, but actually surprisingly not so many, of the interview narratives. We will see
that the London region’s labour market, relatively immune from the crisis, provided a
welcome refuge for graduates fleeing unemployment, blocked career paths or mere
boredom in their home countries. The differential economic effects of the crisis across
Europe are explored in more detail in the next section.
Background data
Intra-EU migration has been rising in recent years, although its overall scale in relation
to total population remains modest. According to data from various sources sum-
marised by Glennie and Pennington (2014, p. 19), the number of EU citizens living in
another member-state increased from 10.2 million in 2007 to 13.4 million in 2012. This
latter figure, however, represents only 2.7 % of total EU population. For the UK, the pro-
portion is somewhat higher – 3.8 %, or 2.4 million people. The UK’s position in the
geography of recent intra-EU flows has evolved over three stages: before and since the
2004 enlargement, and since the 2008 recession. Before 2004, the number of EU
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nationals (excluding returning UK nationals) entering roughly balanced the departures
of Britons heading for other EU countries. After 2004, when Britain opened its labour
market to migrants from the new accession countries, the balance shifted to large-scale
net immigration, far exceeding what was expected. Annual net migration from ‘EU8’
countries of Eastern Europe peaked at 80,000 in 2007 but then dropped to less than
half that figure after the onset of the economic crisis. Since 2004 Poles have been the
biggest group of EU8 entrants, but Latvians and Lithuanians have immigrated at higher
rates when controlled for home-country population size. However, more recently net
migration from the EU to the UK has increased once again (from 65,000 in 2012 to
131,000 in 2013) and its geography of origin has changed, now predominantly from the
Southern EU countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece), where job opportunities, es-
pecially for new graduates, have shrunk and unemployment has risen sharply.
Table 1 displays the profile of total and youth (under 25) unemployment for selected
EU countries before and after the crisis. The figures are the averages of the 2 years im-
mediately preceding the crisis (2007–08) and for the 2 years when, for most countries,
the crisis was at its peak (2012–13). Countries are divided into ‘core’ EU economies
and the three geographical peripheries. In the core countries total unemployment
remained relatively stable and low across the crisis; in Germany it actually decreased.
Youth unemployment figures are higher. For all of the peripheral countries listed in
Table 1, both sets of figures (total and youth unemployment) are higher, as is the pro-
portionate increase across the 5-year period. For total unemployment, most peripheral
countries approximately doubled their rates, and for a few the rates tripled. For youth
Table 1 Unemployment rates in selected EU countries, 2007–08 and 2012–13
Total unemployment (%) Youth unemployment (%)
2007–08 2012–13 2007–08 2012–13
Core countries
UK 5.4 7.5 14.6 20.5
Germany 8.1 5.3 11.2 7.8
Netherlands 3.3 6.1 5.6 10.4
Sweden 6.1 8.0 19.7 23.1
Southern periphery
Portugal 8.7 15.7 16.5 37.0
Spain 9.8 25.4 21.9 53.7
Italy 6.4 11.7 20.8 38.0
Greece 8.0 25.8 22.5 56.8
Cyprus 3.8 14.7 9.6 34.3
Western periphery
Ireland 5.5 13.4 10.8 27.5
Eastern periphery
Estonia 5.0 10.2a 11.0 20.9a
Latvia 7.2 14.9a 11.9 28.4a
Lithuania 4.5 12.4 10.8 24.1
Poland 8.3 10.1 19.5 27.0
Slovakia 10.4 13.9 19.6 33.3
afigure refers to 2012 only
Source: Eurostat, October 2013
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unemployment, the rates are roughly double those for total unemployment, and once
again we observe a 5-year doubling of the rate in many peripheral countries, with very
high rates posted for 2012–13 by the Southern EU countries and Latvia.
Sources and methods
The three case-studies that form the basis of our comparative empirical analysis come
from three independent studies, each carried out by a different co-author of the present
paper. Whilst each study was an individually executed project, they formed part of a
broad research initiative aimed at investigating recent graduate migration patterns
within Europe.1 Our focus on graduates includes those who had been to university and
completed their studies (the vast majority of the participants) but also a few who were
combining part-time study with work and another small number (in the German sam-
ple) who had pursued non-university post-secondary education in order to access pro-
fessional employment.
All three studies involved in-depth face-to-face interviews in the London area with
research participants in their 20s and 30s. Each study asked a similar range of questions
about home-country background, reasons for migration, and the work and other expe-
riences of living in the core region of the UK. Nevertheless, a key feature of all inter-
views was their essentially open nature, allowing each participant to narrate their own
story in their own way, stressing the themes and perspectives they thought were pertin-
ent to their own experience.
Interviews were undertaken in the native language of the participants: German,
Italian, Latvian or Russian. With a few exceptions where extensive notes were taken, all
interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated into English. Interview transcripts
were subject to repeated reading and thematic analysis to extract comparable and dif-
ferentiated themes highlighted across and between the three samples. In all cases, ap-
propriate ethical procedures were followed: informed consent, permission to record,
right to withdraw etc. Names are pseudonyms.
All three samples (39 Germans, 38 Italians and 18 Latvians) are gender-balanced and
incorporated a range of interviewee ages between early 20s and late 30s; some of the
older participants had been longer-resident in the UK. Since there are no accurate reg-
isters of the three populations being studied, the sampling was respondent-driven, in-
cluding some recourse to snowball-sampling. Other participants were recruited via the
researchers’ personal networks and social-media sites. Given the enforced lack of true
random sampling, we cannot be sure of the statistical representativeness of our groups
of interviewees. However, we are confident that we have avoided any marked bias, since
each study also included substantial time spent in participant observation. Although
this does not form part of the analysis in this paper, we use this ethnographic experi-
ence to reinforce our confidence in the rigour and consistency of the analysis presented
below.
The methods we employ are designed to create an explanatory bridge between the
three conceptual frameworks set out earlier and the research questions specified in the
concluding paragraph of the introduction. We were careful to avoid ‘leading questions’
in the interviews and hence did not use terms such as ‘economic crisis’ or ‘core’ and
‘periphery’. Instead we analysed the variable use of these terms, or their close approxi-
mates, in the participants’ narratives, drawing both similarities and differences between
King et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:3 Page 6 of 22
the three graduate nationalities. As we shall see in the case-study evidence which fol-
lows, these references to core–periphery, crisis and global-city London both resonate
across the economic dimension of employment, salaries and careers, and also took in
frequent mentions of culture and lifestyle.
Germans in London: Crisis – what crisis?
Despite the two world wars, Germans are a long-standing presence in the UK, yet
estimates of their current presence vary: probably well in excess of 100,000, but
not as many as the 250,000 German-born enumerated in the census, which in-
cludes substantial numbers of British nationals born in Germany, mainly to armed
service personnel.
Reviewing the interview data and other ethnographic evidence, there are three theor-
etical reference-points which help to characterise young Germans in London. The first
is Favell’s (2008) Eurostar ideal-type: highly educated ‘high-flyers’ who are multilingual,
interculturally competent and often career-mobile high earners. Whilst some of the
German participants fitted this type, most did not attain such an elite status. More typ-
ical were Conradson and Latham’s (2005a) ‘middling transnationalists’, described by
Favell in another of his publications as ‘skilled and educated [migrants such as] stu-
dents, nurses, mid-level technical and clerical employees… upwardly mobile middle
classes’ (Favell, Feldblum, & Smith, 2006, p. 2). Such migrants do not feature high up
the media or political agenda since their movement is largely unnoticed and uncon-
tested. Nevertheless their experiences are highly relevant given their ubiquity in major
European cities and their contribution to urban economies. This trend reveals a general
shift in studies on skilled migration away from a focus on highly trained professionals
to a more heterogenous graduate migrant group (cf. Scott, 2006 on the British in Paris).
The third theoretical notion is ‘lifestyle migration’ (Benson & O’Reilly, 2009), typified
by ‘Brits’ who retire to the south of Spain (O’Reilly, 2000) or to rural France (Benson,
2011). For Germans in London, the lifestyle attraction is not the peaceful landscapes of
the rural idyll, nor the sun-drenched Mediterranean Costas, but the cosmopolitan vibe
of London and its cutting-edge urban lifestyles.
Key themes from the narratives: cautious migration from ‘boring’ Germany
Taken in the round, the interviews indicate that many young Germans engage in a kind
of ‘cautious’ or ‘haphazard’ migration to London (Armbruster, 2010, p. 1237). The UK
is seen as a nearby destination, different from Germany, but not that different; it is
abroad, but not that far away. As interviewee Hannes put it, ‘You don’t have the feeling
that you have to leave everything behind, because you don’t spend 12 h on a plane’.
Hannes is making an implicit comparison with America here – the other main choice
for many Germans (and other graduate Europeans) wanting an ‘anglophone’ work,
business or life experience. This resonates with an interesting passage in Eurostars and
Eurocities where Favell (2008, pp. 39–40) argues that part of the attraction of London
is that it is like New York in Europe; it mimics America’s capitalist and cultural hub,
yet it is more accessible, friendly, humane and socially rich than New York or other big
American cities.
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The relatively short distance and the availability of budget airlines make both home
visits, and visits by friends from Germany, a frequent possibility. Indeed, in the eyes of
many young Germans, a move to London is seen almost as an internal migration, en-
dorsing the ‘free movement’ ethos of the EU. Moreover, the mindset is to view the
move to London as an episode in their lives akin to taking ‘time out’ from their regular
lives, which they will resume sooner or later. Henrik put this nicely as follows:
I quite like living in London… but I know that, in the back of my mind, this is not it, and
that I can imagine going somewhere else… or going back to Germany… I’m flexible.
When I moved here I thought, OK, I’ll do 2 years; now it’s been four, it’ll probably be five;
but I think that at some point I’ll say… I’ve done it, I want something else now…
The pure economic rationale for migration is largely missing from the German narra-
tives, and there is scant mention of the crisis, either in Germany or the UK.2 Rather,
paraphrasing Conradson and Latham (2005b, 2007) in their research on young New
Zealanders in London, what is most relevant are the ‘affective possibilities’ of London
as an exciting setting for a journey of self-realisation. Among Germans, living in an en-
ergetic space of global-city cosmopolitanism, improving their already-competent
English, and escaping from the ‘boring’ and ‘provincial’ German way of life were key
factors behind their moves to London. Two typical interview extracts:
My life in Germany was super-boring… I was really stuck in a routine… You come home
from work, like 5 pm or so, you sit down in front of the telly, and you watch telly until
10.30 when you fall into bed, and it was like that every day… Even if you went shopping
one day, or spent an afternoon on the balcony reading, somehow it was always the same
(Sandra).
I really wanted to live in a metropolis… that was the main reason… it wasn’t that I
was unemployed or anything to do with my career… I was kind of unhappy with my
job [in Germany]; and living in that small city, it was awful… So at some point I just
said, I’m going to do it, I want to go where I want to be, where I like it (Sven).
Indeed for some of the interviewees, their career progression took a back seat, or even
regressed in that they ‘traded down’ to a job in London that was below their qualifications
yet readily available and enough to live on. This was especially characteristic of the female
interviewees. More important than direct career advancement (for some this would occur
upon return in Germany with more-fluent English) was the preference for gaining life ex-
perience in a different city. This is not unique to Germans in the UK: both Scott (2004)
and Conradson and Latham (2007), writing respectively about the British in Paris and
New Zealanders in London, find the same syndrome: the career is put on hold in favour
of broader objectives of enjoying a ‘different’ way of life at a particular life-stage.
In the absence of references to unemployment in Germany or the euro-crisis, the
German participants talked more about their social lives, both in London and back in
Germany. Some tried to maintain a social life in both places, a double challenge that
was found to be more difficult than imagined. The short-hop flight to their local airport
proved to be not that short, once times for travel to and from the airport, plus security
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and check-in, were factored in. Some talked about cutting back on their regular week-
end visiting family and friends because of the pressure and cost of it all and the fact
that, along with hosting weekend visitors from Germany, they had no time to develop
new friendship networks or enjoy the cultural life of London (Mueller, 2015).
‘Home’ and ‘belonging’: London or Germany?
For the majority of German interviewees, their wish to remain connected to their
friends and family in Germany was counter-balanced by their expressed desire not to
become part of a ‘German community’ in the UK. However, many contradicted this
statement by their behaviour, creating and inhabiting distinct German social spaces in
and around London. These spaces included the ‘Zeitgeist’ German pub, ‘after-work
drinks’ sessions in Central London bars, and more informal and mobile social spaces
such as clubs devoted to hiking and other shared activities (Mueller, 2015, p. 629). This
co-national socialisation was done partly out of a need to get help to settle in, especially
in the early stages, and partly as a reaction to the difficulty of creating a meaningful so-
cial network of British friends.
Participants were often ambivalent when discussing when, and indeed if, to return to
Germany. As Conradson and Latham (2005b) found in their study of New Zealanders
in London, decisions to return are often postponed and hence made progressively more
difficult. On the one hand there is the desire to fulfil the original intention to return,
and the pull and expectations of family that this will happen. But this is challenged on
the other hand by the gradual embedding in a new life, with new personal and roman-
tic relationships, and the consequent distancing from ‘home’ in Germany. Consider the
following two contrasting quotes:
Well, my mum is saying I should come back; and then again, there’s not really
anything holding me here. I have a job here, but it’s not that great… it’s not like it’s a
great career! And I don’t have a boyfriend… And if I don’t go back soon, my mother
worries that the career window will close for me, and I’ll be stuck here (Maria).
Over the past 8, 9 years I’ve learnt that Germany as ‘home’ [he uses the word
Heimat3], it doesn’t work, it’s not quite right – not when I’m with my parents, for
example… Once I’ve been there for a day or so, I realise I don’t belong there
anymore, I no longer feel at home there… Of course it’s nice to be home… but then
I feel relatively quickly – that’s not me (Lasse).
Meanwhile, in London, too, not all things are positive and several participants
expressed frustration at the high rents and the fact that they had to share accom-
modation with others. They struggled with the social geography of the city, where
the ‘nice’ areas were too expensive to afford, and the affordable areas were per-
ceived as a bit too ‘dangerous’ or unpleasant. Their idealised plan to acquire lots
of British friends and experience the multicultural atmosphere of the city was often
thwarted by the reality of people’s busy lives, living dispersed in different parts of
London. In the following interview extract Sven reflects on how little contact he
had with English people:
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Well, on the one hand it would be nice [to know some English people], just to get an
insight into their culture and the life here, because I don’t know at all what English
people do all day long, what they do in the evenings… apart from going to the pub
and getting drunk. But again on the other hand, I’m not forcing it, because I have
lots of other friends, and I wouldn’t even have time to meet them.
Sven’s failure to acquire ‘local’ English friends is justified by two discursive devices.
First, there is his moral condemnation of them as drunkards; and second, he claims he
is too busy to meet them anyway! Most probably, Sven’s aspiration was frustrated by
the elusiveness of ‘authentic locals’ in a city where so many people are of minority
background or are migrants from other parts of Britain and Ireland.
Perhaps the greatest sense of ambivalence surrounds the participants’ relationship to
other Germans in London. German migrants are almost celebratory in the way they
claim not to want to meet fellow-Germans. Yet most, like Sven, had German friends
and spent part of their free time socialising within German social spaces. The self-
construction of Germans as independent and open-minded, anxious to blend in with
the English and the wider multicultural mix of London, intersected with a generalised
picture of other migrant groups as ethnically more compact. Participants would often
say that ‘we Germans’ are not like ‘the Italians’ or ‘the Spanish’, who were portrayed as
rejoicing upon meeting co-nationals, speaking their own language, embracing each
other, and becoming instant best friends. According to Andreas:
Well, the Germans, they’re not like the Spanish, or the Italians… who always hang out
together; and that’s a good thing. Germans abroad tend to do their own thing, they try
to get in touch with indigenous people… Here in this pub [where the interview took
place], there’s a lot of Spanish people working here, and they live with other Spanish
people, and then even after 10 years of living here, they don’t speak any English.
Andreas’ blanket characterisation of the Spanish in London is certainly wide of the
mark, based on superficial observation and common gossip. Jendrissek’s (2014) recent
study of young Spanish graduate migrants in Southampton tells a different story – one
of reasonably rapid progress in employment and of good ability to learn English. He
did find them very sociable, with each other and with himself as a researcher. We do
not have Spaniards in our three-way comparative study, but we do have Italians.
Italians in London: fleeing structural crisis
Although the Italian graduates interviewed in the London area have some similarities
to the Germans – they can both be considered ‘middling transnationalists’, with a few
‘Eurostars’ thrown in – there are key differences. First, evident in all the interviews,
there is a much more explicit economic and employment rationale. There are strong
push factors driving Italian graduate emigration; as well as the perceived pull factors of
the more open and meritocratic London labour market. Second, the Italian narratives
make frequent use of the word ‘crisis’. This is deployed less as a reference to the post-
2008 financial crisis (though this is indeed mentioned by some), and more as a broader
reference to the Italian structural crisis of a blocked future for young highly educated
Italians in a society seen as hierarchical and corrupt, especially in the South of Italy.
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Table 1 showed that, across the 5 years from 2007–08 to 2012–13, both total and youth
employment almost doubled. Data for 2014 shows youth unemployment at 42 %, and a
staggering 68 % in the Southern region of Calabria.
The reprise of emigration from Italy and the other Southern EU countries reflects our
earlier discussion of the role of migration in European centre–periphery dynamics, and the
way that this new wave of highly qualified emigrants is but the latest stage of a historical
model of Southern European migrations, coherent across Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece
(King, 2015). In these southern eurozone countries, economic growth has stagnated or gone
into reverse. The Italian economy shrunk by 9 % in real terms over the 6 years 2008–14.
There has been serious debate in all these countries about economic strategies to move out
of the crisis and about the seeming inevitability of the brain drain northwards.
In Italy there is an academic literature about la fuga dei cervelli dating back more
than a decade (for some key studies see Associazione Dottori di Ricerca Italian 2001;
Avveduto & Brandi, 2004; Becker, Ichino, & Peri, 2004; Morano-Foadi, 2006), with the
brain-drain phenomenon itself traceable to the 1990s. There are several worrying
trends revealed by findings in this literature. For instance, Becker et al. find a quadru-
pling of the share of graduates amongst total emigrants during the 1990s; at the end of
the decade there were eight times more Italian graduates living abroad than there were
foreign graduates living in Italy (Becker et al., 2004, p. 25). Graduate emigration from
Italy was also found to be academically selective. Migration propensity is higher
amongst those with top-class degrees from the more prestigious universities (Becker et
al., 2004, pp. 25–26; Di Pietro, 2005, p. 20).
Another change noted by recent commentators on Italian graduate migration is a
shift in the types of job graduates are willing to take when they move abroad. Accord-
ing to a recent Economist article unedifyingly titled ‘PIGS can fly’, the pre-crisis mi-
grants arrived in London to take well-paid ‘Eurostar’ jobs in London’s banks, hedge
funds and consultancies, or to research and teach in Britain’s universities. Now the mi-
grants are more numerous, and more desperate. According to the Economist article,
‘most new arrivals tend to start out in poorly paid work and live in the cheaper bits of
inner London. Getting professional qualifications approved is expensive and finding
good jobs takes time. Work in the catering industry, by contrast, is plentiful’.4 Here, we
see evidence of ‘brain waste’ since, like many recent graduates from the Eastern
European accession countries, migration facilitates access to employment but often way
below the formal qualification levels held by the migrants.5
As with all statistics on intra-European migration in the era of free movement, estimates
of the number of Italians living in the UK are no better than informed guesses. The 2011
Census recorded 130,000 Italian-born, but many of these are long-resident and now elderly
labour migrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s. Guesstimates put the real scale of the
Italian presence as at least 200,000 – the opposite situation to the German case where the
Germany-born total exceeds the ‘real’ German presence by roughly similar numbers.
Key themes from the narratives: gerontocrazia, mentalità, raccomandazione
All of the Italian participants spoke at length about the obstacles ingrained in Italian soci-
ety and the labour market, frustrating the ability of graduates to get a well-paid job, build
a career, buy a flat, get married, and have children. This multiple blockage forces them to
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live with their parents, often well into their 30s. Eurostat data show that 85 % of Italian
18–29-year-olds live with their parents, higher than any other major EU country.6
Many participants posed their critique of Italian society within the frame of it being a
gerontocracy, with all the key positions in Italian business, politics, university and the
public sphere monopolised by older men,7 and too many economic resources geared to
the needs and benefits of the elderly, including some of the highest pensions in Europe,
especially for senior public servants. By contrast, the country spends relatively little on
housing, unemployment assistance and childcare – expenditures the young depend on
to develop their careers and ‘adult’ lives. Here are two short extracts from interviews
which illustrate the above issues:
There is a socio-political situation in Italy that I really don’t like… Italy is an old so-
ciety folded in on itself… There is no investment in young people, and you can see
this from the country’s politics, and what happens when you look for a job… It seems
like they are doing you a favour by giving you a job (Arianna).
I had always lived at home; I wanted to live away from home… I wanted to do
something extra, and to do it on my own, without anybody to help me or someone
to tell me ‘Call me if you have a problem’… It’s a test… You say to yourself: ‘OK, but
are you actually capable of doing something on your own?’ (Mirco).
Two Italian words which recurred time and time again in the Italian interviews were
raccomandazione and mentalità. Their English literal translations, ‘recommendation’
and ‘mentality’, fail to convey their true depth of meaning and social significance. To-
gether these two keywords sum up the diagnosis of despair that young Italian graduates
hold about their country. The culture of doing favours, ‘pulling strings’, and needing a
‘patron’ to press your case to get a job is pervasive in Italy, especially, it is often
claimed, in the South where jobs are scarcer than in the richer North. Although most
jobs, business tenders, public works contracts etc. are required by law to be advertised,
in practice everyone knows who will get the job or contract – the person who has links
to powerful people such as politicians, directors or administrators who either make the
decisions or who have the power to influence decisions. Hence, raccomandazione is so
much more than being ‘recommended’ for a job; it is a whole system of power broker-
ing, nepotism and favours in which the best candidates frequently fail to get the post
they rightfully deserve. Rita summed up the situation perfectly:
If you stay in Italy, the only way to get a job is through raccomandazione. When you
go for a job, everyone says that you need a raccomandazione. If you stay in Italy and
try to get work without a raccomandazione then you are a fool because you either
make it your life’s goal to go against the system, or you end up living at home with
your parents until you are 50.
Academic research on what Zinn (2001, p. 167) calls ‘the Italian societal embarrass-
ment’ of raccomandazione approaches the phenomenon from two angles. The simpler
interpretation is that it is the logical outcome of a mismatch between supply and de-
mand – too many people chasing too few jobs. Because this mismatch is more acute in
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the South of Italy than in the North, raccomandazione is seen as a particularly ‘south-
ern’ problem – from Rome down to Calabria and Sicily, where it is particularly associ-
ated with a ‘mafia’ mentality.8 Angela, originally from Calabria, points to the
widespread nepotism which she sees as endemic to the South of Italy:
The entire work environment in the South is de-qualifying. For me it was a devastat-
ing experience. I felt I virtually had to grovel to my employer for giving me a job pay-
ing 300 Euros a month! Employers in the South really take advantage of people,
especially graduates… The problem is the culture of raccomandazione… you really
need to be connected to someone powerful… because if you have connections, at
least you have a chance. The few jobs that there are, get hijacked in this way… There
are five jobs available, and they are all already allocated, that’s how it is.
The second interpretation of raccomandazione draws on what are argued as deeply
embedded ‘Southern’ social characteristics arising out of a long history of colonisation,
exploitation and marginalisation of the region and its inhabitants. In a controversial
book, Banfield (1958) advanced an explanation of the ‘backwardness’ of the South
based on the behavioural notion of ‘amoral familism’ – the prioritisation of the self and
one’s family over all else, so that society functions ‘amorally’. Although Banfield’s thesis
has been subject to searching critique, condemned by many authors for its ‘Northern’,
‘colonialist’ interpretation of the moral geography of Italy (see, for instance, Goddard
1996, pp. 163–182; Piattoni, 1998), even these critical voices acknowledge the key role
of familism in (Southern) Italy, and of the set of values that derive from the importance
of family – including the third thematic term dominant in the Italian interviewee narra-
tives, mentalità, itself a term of many nuances and scales.
At the national level, there is seen to be an overarching system characterised by ger-
ontocracy, clientelism and bureaucracy, producing a response of disaffection and a gen-
eral mentality of cheating the system. People observe how politicians behave and follow
their example – seeking favours and kickbacks, avoiding paying taxes and fines, and
protecting their own interests and those of their cronies. Then there is a provincial-
level mentality, which leads people to strongly identify with their home city/town and
its region, giving them a narrow outlook. In the Italian literature on migration and
identity this is generally referred to as campanilismo – attachment to place or locality,
symbolically represented by the bell-tower (campanile) of the town or village church
(see Baldassar, 2001: 110–149). Finally there is the ‘mentality of the family’, which ex-
pects loyalty to the family above all else – (amoral) familism again. For most Italians,
these various dimensions of mentalità are internalised through growing up in Italy.
Railing against the Italian mentality may be a driving-force for emigration, but the true
significance of mentalità is often only appreciated after having lived abroad. Rita ex-
pands on this point:
There are two factors, no three [that caused her move to London]. First, the
economic factor that, whether you like it or not, is a major pull. The second one is
career satisfaction. And then there is the mentalità that I still notice today, probably
even more when I visit home… Somehow I cannot see myself there anymore, neither
myself nor my husband… You feel like a fish out of water… like you have nothing in
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common with the people there… Here [in London] we identify much more with the
way of life, with their lifestyle models.
Disidentification from Italy
Rita’s interview extract clearly indicates her process of ‘disidentification’ with Italy and
the Italian way of life as represented by the Italian mentalità. Unlike the German coun-
terparts who, on the whole (although with some exceptions), have a high regard for
their country and plan on going back there sooner or later, Italian participants’ pro-
found disillusionment with Italy approximates to what Dickie (2001) has called
‘inverted patriotism’. Whilst, for some, this disidentification is so strong that it leads
them to never want to live in Italy again, for others the reaction is more nuanced, even
conflictual: they still identify strongly as ‘Italians’, but as ‘Italians’ who have left the
country out of frustration and as a strategy of survival. The Italians in London thus see
themselves as a different ‘kind’ of Italian – as having a different mentalità to those who
live in Italy. As Rita’s quote implies, they socialise widely outside their national group,
and are selective with regard to other Italians, who generally need to have an allied
ideological stance. They do not resolutely ‘hang out together’ only with other Italians,
as stated earlier by German interviewee Andreas.
Our final point is to return to Italy’s regional dimension. Those graduates who come
from the South have a stronger economic push factor behind their migration, reflecting
the extremely high graduate and youth unemployment rates in southern Italy and the
sense of hopelessness and resignation behind the culture of raccomandazione. Gradu-
ates from the North of Italy, especially those from prosperous cities like Milan and
Bologna, are migrating to London more for career enhancement. Rather than simply
escaping unemployment, more often they leave their jobs in order to take another job,
or to seek job opportunities which are more rewarding, either financially or in terms of
the type of work and longer-term career satisfaction.
Latvians in London: from small-scale periphery to metropolitan urbanism
Latvian graduates migrate from an EU peripheral context which is quite different
from the Southern one: theirs is Eastern, post-socialist and post-Soviet. The other
distinctive feature of the Latvian case is the small size of the country; this adds a
further dimension to the conceptualisation of peripheral status. The Latvian popu-
lation, 2 million in 2011, down from 2.3 million in 2001, largely due to emigration,
is much lower than those of the other countries considered in this paper. Never-
theless, informed estimates of the number of Latvians living in Britain range be-
tween 60,000 and 100,000 for 2011.9
Latvia’s class and ethno-linguistic background has a strong influence over the
patterning of emigration. One-third of the population is Russian-speaking, and they
constitute an important subgroup amongst the emigrants. Latvian society lacks a trad-
itional elite; they were either killed or exiled in earlier times. A ‘new elite’ has arisen
out of privatisation and post-Soviet business enterprise, amongst whom is a small
subclass of ‘super-rich’. Meanwhile some of the Soviet-era middle-status groups –
teachers, administrators, technical workers, health personnel etc. – have struggled to
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keep their jobs and status within a society that has progressively become more unequal,
with widespread if hidden poverty.
Recent emigration has taken place in two main waves: a first one immediately after
accession to the EU opened up new possibilities for much higher incomes earned
abroad, in Britain and Ireland especially; and a second one triggered by the financial
crisis and sudden spike in unemployment in the late 2000s. Some of the statistics of
Latvia’s boom-bust-recovery are remarkable. GDP grew by 90 % between 2000 and
2007, then fell by 25 % 2007–09, recovering by 18 % by 2013 (Blanchard, Griffiths, &
Gruss, 2013). Unemployment figures are shown in Table 1. The large-scale emigration
of the past decade has affected all classes and all parts of the country; most of it is des-
tined for low-status jobs in agriculture, food processing, construction, domestic clean-
ing and care-work in the UK and Ireland; but there is a more urban-origin graduate
emigration mainly to the London region.
Main narrative themes: crisis, smallness, and low ceilings for high-flyers
Amongst the Latvian participants, reference to ‘crisis’ was prominent, reflecting the two
temporalities mentioned above:
 the general crisis of the initially liberatory but then difficult exit from the
hegemonic control of the Soviet Union (1991) and subsequent transition to EU
membership in 2004;
 the financial crisis of 2008–09, when the Latvian banks failed and had to resort to
IMF rescue funds, a strategy accompanied by widespread job losses, pension and
welfare cuts, renewed poverty and emigration.
Within the overall narrative arc of economic and personal crisis, there was constant
reference to Latvia being a small and peripheral country: in one interviewee’s words, ‘a
small, small, narrow place’. This subnarrative of smallness has two elements contained
within it: one economic and the other cultural. The economic arguments are the well-
known issues of limited economies of scale in production and marketing; the domestic
labour market is ‘truncated’ and insufficiently specialised to absorb all the skills and
specialisms of graduates’ job aspirations. The cultural arguments are less well
researched but equally relevant as push factors for migration: the country is seen by its
younger inhabitants as small, provincial, conservative, culturally introverted and prone
to racism and homophobia. By contrast, London is seen as a financial powerhouse
where jobs, incomes and educational opportunities are all way above what is available
in Latvia; and culturally London is seen as open, sophisticated, tolerant and ethnically
diverse. The globalised appeal of London and the peripherality of Latvia are well articu-
lated in the following quote from Alex:
I was working in [names bank, which went bust in the crisis], the salary was good and
the work was interesting, but I always knew I could achieve more… London is the closest
financial centre and it’s in Europe, the others are in the US or Asia… I knew that in order
to develop contacts I had to study at the London Business School... it’s expensive but it’s
an entrance ticket… you have a network of course-mates and an important line in your
CV… London is a very central place globally. My parents live in [names town in a remote
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region of Latvia], and if I go to visit them… Honestly, I went to a wedding in Delhi recently
and it was a faster trip than to [names Latvian town].
The notion of a ‘low ceiling’ was mentioned by several interviewees, both as a reason to leave
and an obstacle to returning. Two typical quotes, both from recent graduates in their 20s:
I was working as a journalist in a leading Russian-language newspaper in Latvia… I was
24, and I was already head of the news department. I had a good salary, by Latvian
standards. But the ceiling is just too low in Latvia; it is such a small country and so
few newspapers (Nika).
Nobody has invited me to return to Riga and I am not sure I would ever be able to
do it. My problem is that I am used to the level of salary here, and the quality of life.
Moreover I like people here… whereas in Latvia I see that people are hostile;
sometimes I feel that they almost hate me… Of course, I understand that this is
related to poverty and differences in income (Katrina).
We next consider the case of Reinis, an intra-company transferee in his mid-20s, whose
interview covered several key points raised in a more fragmentary way by other partici-
pants. We see how the financial crisis was the ‘trigger’ of a migration that had long been
contemplated, and we hear of the opportunities offered by London for self-development.
Latvia, meanwhile, is seen as ‘simply too small’ for an adventurous careerist.
Since childhood, I always wanted to live abroad, I was always interested in other
people, other cultures. I was studying in Riga and got a very good job in banking and
then in consultancy. At that time I felt the time was not right yet; that I could
actually grow and learn faster in Riga. And then, with the crisis, my bosses said there
is a chance to transfer to London, and I said yes! It was a win–win situation.
[…]
London is very cosmopolitan, it’s like a state within a state. I realise that England is not
like London, but I like it here a lot. In my team we are 19 people, and we speak 12 or
13 languages between us… Here, you are appreciated if you speak several languages.
[…]
[In London] I am trying to learn as much as possible. In Latvia I never had time for
this, I was too busy with friends, parties, sports. Here I am investing in myself… I
want to learn the maximum I can here.
In the final extract we quote, Reinis talks about keeping in frequent touch with Latvia
through his business trips, his prospects for return, and other plans for the future.
I am going often to Latvia; I try to combine when tickets are paid for by the company so
I can go home for free… If I return to Latvia, I want to do a job which is very
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international… at least several trips outside of Latvia per month. The worldview is so
different here [in London], much wider. And I want that taste of different cultures,
diversity, colours… therefore I think my aim is beyond Latvia. I would be happy to get a
job in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, or Singapore… why not?… What Latvia lacks is pleasant
positive communication, constructive discussion, sharing ideas and opinions. In Latvia it
is often seen negatively if you want to debate… constructive critique is really lacking
there.
A final narrative theme that emerged more strongly in the Latvian interviews than in
those with German or Italian graduates (where, indeed, it was practically absent) was a
more philanthropic desire to contribute to the development of the home country, either
in terms of business development (mostly by males) or through charitable work (mostly
by females). Santa had first gone to England to see a friend who was studying at university.
This visit prompted her to follow suit, so she prepared her application, got in, worked
hard ‘doing typical guestworker jobs’ to support her studies, and upon graduation landed
a job with an advertising agency. She saw her future resolutely as being in England:
I just have to stay in London where I can see my career going straight up. If I stay
here another 10 years I will build opportunities for my whole life. I will have my own
flat, then my own home… a fully developed life. Wherever I go for work, I know it
will not be Latvia… and that hurts a lot.
Santa’s guilt at not contemplating a return to her country (for very rational economic
and lifestyle reasons) is assuaged by a charitable desire to try to remove some of the de-
ficiencies in Latvian society:
I am now thinking that I may launch a charity fund in Latvia, a cancer fund to get
better treatment for the elderly… It’s absurd how it is now in Latvia, that you cannot
get adequate treatment and medicine.
Ethnic Russians: turning disadvantage into advantage
Latvian society, politics and the media are divided between the Latvian-language majority
and the Russian-speaking minority. This divide is replicated throughout the Baltic States,
though it is sharper in Latvia than it is in Estonia or Lithuania. After independence from
the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvian was declared the only state language, which meant that
young Latvians did not learn Russian anymore, yet young Russians were required to learn
Latvian. Many young Russians decided to prioritise English as their preferred ‘foreign’ lan-
guage, realising that their unique status as native-Russian-speaking EU members gave
them a comparative advantage in the London-based global labour market where know-
ledge of emerging-economy languages is important. Alex, who was the first interviewee
quoted in the Latvian section of our paper, went on to talk about his particular qualifica-
tions for the job he now holds in an international insurance company:
They saw my CV, but the main question was whether I was willing to work in
emerging markets… The important thing for them was that I spoke Russian fluently
and that I know the [Russian] culture.
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Other interviewees who were from the Russian minority expressed frustration at the
nationalistic turn of Latvia’s post-Soviet governments. Unsurprisingly, there is a huge
debate on this in Latvia, as well as an extensive academic literature (see Cheskin 2013
for a useful summary). What does this mean for young graduate emigrants from the
russophone minority in Latvia? Two things, both illustrated in the interview extract of
Dimitrij, who now works for an engineering company in London. The first point is that
the Russians’ sense of marginalisation and frustration in Latvia is a contributory factor
in their decision to emigrate.
The problem in Latvia is that it is moving in the wrong direction [i.e. towards ethno-
nationalism]. I am Russian but I am a citizen of Latvia. The world is globalised…
why are Latvian politicians thinking so narrowly?
The second point is about how Russian-speaking Latvians position themselves in re-
lation to Latvia, Russia, Europe and the world in terms of their regional identities and
future migration plans. Cheskin carried out focus-group research with Russian-
speaking participants (students, postgraduates, and older residents) in Riga. He found
that most, and especially the highly educated, saw themselves as quite distinct from
Russians in Russia and able to integrate, at least at a pragmatic level, many aspects of
Latvianness without, however, fully embracing Latvian culture, which is not ‘their’ cul-
ture (Cheskin, 2013, pp. 308–309). One refuge from this identificatory dilemma is to
resort to a wider regional, global or European identity, part of which is used to differen-
tiate ‘backward’, nationalistic Latvia from progressive, open, multicultural Europe, as
Dimitrij does in the quote above. In the interviews with this subset of the Latvian par-
ticipants, it was found that they do associate more with other Russian speakers due to
linguistic affinity, but they also distinguish themselves from ‘Russian Russians’, empha-
sising the interviewees’ Latvian/Baltic identity.
Conclusions
This paper has had a broad conceptual, empirical and comparative agenda and, in con-
clusion, we bring our empirical findings back into conversation with the three under-
girding concepts specified at the outset – core–periphery, global cities, and the
economic crisis.
First, we have rejuvenated the centre–periphery spatial framework of uneven develop-
ment and structural inequality to shed light on the migration decisions and movement
patterns of young graduates from three countries located in the centre (Germany) and
in the north-eastern (Latvia) and southern (Italy) peripheries of Europe. Each of the
three migrations examined represents a different geo-economic and cultural position-
ing. The consciousness of being from a peripheral and under-privileged part of Europe
was recurrent in the narratives of participants from Latvia and from the southern part
of Italy, but almost entirely absent from the Germans’ accounts. In Italy and Latvia
these ‘push factors’ for graduate emigration were also discussed in the context of a de-
veloping ‘brain drain’ – another syndrome of peripherality and subjugation to the pull
factors of the ‘core’. For the Germans, there were only coded references to cores and
peripheries, expressed more in cultural and lifestyle terms: the ‘boring’ life in small-
town Germany contrasted with the vibrant social and cultural life in a global city. A
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similar case of cultural peripherality was found in Southern Italy where, in the eyes of
many interviewees, the still-powerful mechanisms of clientelism and ‘recommendations’
were symptomatic of backwardness.
Second, we found that many interviewees tapped into the essence of London as both
the economic hub of Europe and a city of truly global significance. As a global city
which seems to capture the imagination of graduates the world over, London functions
as a magnet for many types of highly educated mobility: for some it was a place to
build a future life long-term; for others, a place to stay awhile and then move on or re-
turn home. Although there were some tough challenges – the high cost of accommoda-
tion, the travel times across the city for work or to see friends – most were able to find
in London what they were looking for. Above all, this meant remunerative employ-
ment, the chance to further their career with international work experience, or take
‘time out’ in a less demanding job. A minority of participants from each group filled
the Eurostar mould, but most followed more modest lifestyles in middle-range office
and administrative work, or had come to continue their studies. This more ‘middling’
trend adds an extra layer to Sassen’s (2001) portrayal of the global city as increasingly
polarised socio-economically through immigration of both elites and low-wage workers
in a new division of migrant labour.
Taking each group in turn, German graduates rarely prioritise the economic rationale
of moving to London: for them it is mainly about the city’s cultural and social attrac-
tions, its cosmopolitan and multicultural atmosphere and other urban lifestyle attri-
butes. For Latvians, the story is almost the opposite. Whilst not unappreciative of the
city’s cultural scene, their migration is couched very much in terms of pure economic
opportunity, contrasted with the restricted options and low incomes for graduates at
home, due to the small scale and rigid nature of the graduate labour market. Italians
are driven to London by their moral condemnation of the ‘Italian system’, against which
the deregulated and fairly transparent labour market of London offers them a wider
range of opportunities to those who are ‘good enough’ to get the job in question.
Third, there is the keyword, crisis. The relevance of the financial crisis in migration
decision-making and behaviour emerged unevenly across the three groups: hardly men-
tioned at all by the Germans; featuring frequently in the Italian narratives, but more in
the sense of a historically embedded systemic crisis within Italian society; and occurring
as a common element in the Latvian accounts where the suddenness and severity of
the economic crisis was a trigger for many young adults (and others) to migrate to the
UK and elsewhere.
What does this triple comparative study tell us about contemporary graduate migra-
tion? Why is graduate migration important? Recent Eurostat data reviewed by Recchi
(2015) and King, Lulle, Moroşanu, and Williams (2016) reveal that half of all intra-EU
migration between the 15 pre-2004 member-states has been made up of graduates. For
the 2004 accession states, the figure is lower – 22 %. EU enlargement had the effect of
dramatically increasing the share of intra-EU migration compared to the in-migration
of third-country nationals. Moreover, the migrants, especially those moving from the
southern and eastern EU countries into the EU15, are more than twice as likely as the
host populations to be youthful (under 35 years of age).
Evidence presented in this paper reveals, however, that graduate migrants follow
heterogenous career paths and equally variable spatial trajectories. The ‘pull’ of
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London’s graduate labour market does not provide graduate-level jobs for all. Whilst
some in-migrants progress their high-level careers, others are content to ‘mark time’,
and yet others forced to trade down to menial jobs, at least for a while. The heterogen-
eity of employment outcomes appears to have increased in the wake of the economic
crisis in the peripheral states of Europe. For all but a few, country and place of origin
continue to loom large in their imaginaries of the future; however, return is by no
means taken for granted and for some it is even forsworn. Both economic factors and
the lifestyle and culture of London generate widespread ambiguity about the future.
Such ambiguity is indicative partly of the relative youth of our study population, but
also raises a broader question-mark about the degree of permanency of these new
intra-European skilled migrants.
Endnotes
1The Italian and German samples were drawn from PhD theses (respectively Conti,
2012; Mueller, 2013) and the Latvian one was a separate study undertaken alongside,
but not an integral part of, a PhD on Latvian migrants in Guernsey (Lulle, 2014).
2However, in Meier’s (2009) study of Germans employed in the banking/financial sec-
tor in London, there is more reference to salaries and careers.
3The German word Heimat is very difficult to render in English, not least be-
cause the English word ‘home’ is equally difficult to pin down because of its
multiple-scale meanings, but also because Heimat is heavily laden with political
baggage and ideological myths about the ethnically pure German ‘homeland’
(Huber & O’Reilly, 2004: 330). As used by our participants, Heimat generally re-
ferred to the region of childhood and family origin in Germany, rather than the ac-
tual bricks-and-mortar home, and was spoken of with feelings of nostalgia as an
imaginary space of the past, but also sometimes of rejection as something left be-
hind and too boring to return to.
4See the article ‘PIGS can fly’, Economist, 16 November 2013. PIGS is an unfortunate
acronym for the four Southern EU countries: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.
5There is a growing literature on the phenomenon of brain waste: see, for example,
Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden (2008).
6Malta’s figure is 89 %, but Malta is exceptional because of its small size, dense popu-
lation and limited housing market.
7A few years ago, when the Italian interviews were being carried out, the combined
ages of Italy’s three most powerful figurehead-leaders, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi,
President Giorgio Napolitano, and Pope Benedict XVI, summed to nearly 250. An
equally symbolic departure came when Matteo Renzi took over as Italy’s youngest-ever
Prime Minister in 2014, aged 39.
8However, this ‘southern’ or ‘mafia’ interpretation has been likened to ‘oriental-
ism’ by Schneider (1998) and needs to be at least nuanced if not challenged; see,
especially, the essays by Eve (1996) and Piattoni (1998) for more critical insights
into the subtleties and also the mistaken assumptions imbricated in terms such as
‘corruption’, ‘clientelism’, etc.
9Estimates from the UK Home Office, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Oxford Migration Observatory.
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